COVER FE ATURE assert some of their identity attributes, such as their favorite drink, they certainly can't be trusted to assert all of them, such as their qualifications or criminal records. Thus, different authoritative sources are responsible for assigning different attributes to individuals.
In role-based access control (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC), authorization is based on the user's roles or attributes, respectively. Federated identity management (FIM) systems typically adopt the ABAC model. The systems that assign attributes to users, the IdPs, are different from and remote to the systems that consume them and grant access to the users, the service providers (SPs). Thus, trust must be established between the IdPs and SPs.
Federations build upon this trust. Authorization to use a federated service is based on a user's identity attributes. If trusted authoritative sources provide these attributes, the SP can be assured of the user's identity, even if it doesn't know the user's various IdP identifiers. Hence the emergence of systems such as Shibboleth 1 and Windows CardSpace (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/ library/aa480189.aspx), which let an arbitrary number of IdPs and SPs form trust relationships among themselves in a federation.
Unfortunately, a current limitation of such systems is that users can only select one of their IdPs in any given N o single person or system knows anyone's complete set of identity attributes. Individuals are most likely to know most of the attributes that identify them, but there are still limitations-for example, they might not know how much others trust them. Invariably then, computer systems typically only hold the partial identities of people-a subset of their digital identity attributes. These computer systems are known as identity providers (IdPs).
Usually, authoritative sources must confer identity attributes on individuals. While people may be trusted to
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Most federated identity management systems are limited by users' ability to choose only one identity provider per service session. A proposed linking service lets users securely link their various identity provider (IdP) accounts, enabling the system to aggregate attributes from multiple authoritative sources automatically without requiring users to authenticate separately to each IdP.
Attribute AggregAtioN iN FederAted ideNtity MANAgeMeNt
must give an SP the aggregated set of attributes without knowing about one another's involvement.
IdP-mediated attribute aggregation
Another model that builds on the Liberty Alliance work envisages IdPs forming pairwise relationships, called partnerships, and sharing secret keys to cement their relationship. 4 At any time, a user can link his two accounts at a partnership by authenticating to each IdP in two separate Web browser sessions and providing each with the same random string. The IdPs can then transfer this secret to each other, thereby providing proof that the same user was simultaneously accessing them both. This enables the IdPs to link the user's two accounts together, with each including its own random alias in the message exchange. When a user subsequently contacts an SP and the SP requests the user's attributes from one IdP, the IdP returns the random alias (suitably encrypted) and details of the partner IdP to the SP, allowing the SP to fetch the linked attributes.
While this scheme has the same privacy properties as the Liberty Alliance model, it also suffers from the same privacy deficiency.
Identity proxying
The myVocs system 5 features an alternative mechanism based on identity proxying. 6 In this model, the SP has one IdP that it trusts absolutely; other IdPs are unknown to the SP, and they only have trust relationships with the primary IdP, not with the SP. The system channels all user access requests through this trusted primary IdP, which then relays the user to his chosen IdP. The chosen IdP authenticates the user and returns his attributes to the primary IdP, which strips off the assertion wrapper, supplements the attributes with its own user attributes, and returns the aggregated set to the SP as its own attribute assertion.
The danger with this model is that the primary IdP can assert any attributes about any user to the SP, since it is trusted absolutely to assert everything. The SP has no knowledge about which IdPs originally asserted which user attributes. This trust model thus won't work in many real-life scenarios.
Other models
There are several other attribute aggregation models. 6 In the applications database model, an SP stores a subset of user attributes locally and merges these with ones provided by a federated IdP. Identity relay is an advanced form of identity proxying that reduces the amount of trust needed in the primary IdP; the SP receives attribute assertions from both IdPs rather than from just the primary IdP. In the client-mediated assertion collection model, an intelligent client independently guides the user to authenticate to multiple IdPs, pulling attribute assertions from each one and then presenting the combined set to the SP. Finally, session with an SP, after which the IdP sends an authentication and attribute assertion to the SP. Consequently, authorization is limited to a subset of the user's identity attributes. For many Web-based services, this isn't enough. What is needed is a mechanism that lets users aggregate attributes from multiple IdPs in a single service session.
PrevIOus research
Early work on attribute aggregation assumed that the user had a globally unique identifier common across all the attribute authorities. 2 This was usually an X.500 distinguished name held in an X.509 public-key certificate assigned by a certification authority-subsequently standardized in 2001 in X.509 attribute certificates. Users only needed to authenticate once, with their public-key certificate, and then merging together the different attributes from the different attribute certificates was easy since they all contained the same user distinguished name. In reality, however, few users have X.509 public-key or attribute certificates but instead have different user names and attributes assigned to them by their various IdPs.
Identity federation
The Liberty Alliance (www.projectliberty.org) was the first group to address the attribute aggregation problem in this scenario, through its concept of identity federation. 3 In this model, as the user moves between services in a federation, the first IdP to authenticate the user asks him if he would like to be introduced to other IdPs in the federation. When the user subsequently authenticates to a second IdP, it invites him to federate his second identity with that from the first IdP. If the user agrees, the two IdPs each create a random alias for the user and exchange these behind the scenes. In this way, neither IdP knows the user's true login identifier at the other IdP, but each can refer to the same user via the random aliases, and thereby aggregate the attributes.
While this model effectively protects the user's identifiers and stops IdPs from exchanging data about users without their consent, each IdP still knows that a "federated" user has some attributes at the other IdP. This isn't mirrored in real life: My credit card company need not know that I'm a member of the IEEE, or vice versa, yet I might still want to use both these attributes in a single transaction, for example, to buy a book from an online store and gain a discount due to my IEEE membership. Thus, multiple IdPs Identity relay is an advanced form of identity proxying that reduces the amount of trust needed in the primary IdP.
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Our model preserves privacy by requiring a minimum of trust between the actors. The user, IdPs, and SPs trust the linking service to hold the IdP links securely and only divulge them to SPs under user instructions. The service functions as an honest broker to secure the links without knowing any user identities. An IdP or SP that doesn't trust the linking service simply won't interact with it.
The model also removes the burden from the user of having to authenticate to each IdP separately during service provision. Only one authentication exchange is required, and this can be to any one of the IdPs linked together in the service. It is only the authenticating IdP that becomes known to the other linked IdPs during service provisioning, without the latter being revealed to the former.
LInkIng servIce
The linking service consists of several phases. Figure 1 illustrates the link registration phase. A user, Julie, goes to the webpage of her preferred linking service, which displays a list of all the IdPs with which it has trust relationships, and selects one to which she wants to create links. The linking service redirects her to the chosen IdP, which asks her to log in and authenticate. She authenticates using the IdP's chosen method. Upon successful authentication, the IdP creates a random (but permanent) identifier for her to use solely with the linking service.
Link registration
The IdP returns an authentication assertion containing this permanent ID (PID). This assertion effectively says, "I have authenticated this user, and she is to be known in SP-mediated attribute aggregation, the SP sequentially redirects the client to different IdPs. This requires the user to authenticate to each IdP in turn, after which the SP retrieves an attribute assertion from that IdP. The SP continues to collect the various attribute assertions until it has enough to authorize the user.
cOncePtuaL MOdeL
SP-and client-mediated collections are secure and fully protect user privacy as there are no links between the IdPs, but users must authenticate to each IdP to collect the various attribute assertions, which they may find too tedious. Identity relay is secure but somewhat compromises user privacy in that the primary IdP is aware of the user's links with the other IdPs; this violates Kim Cameron's third law of identity-justifiable parties (www.identityblog. com/?p=352/#lawsofiden_topic).
The model we propose is a variant on both IdP-mediated attribute aggregation and identity relay, and introduces a linking service, a new Web service that both holds the links between user identities and relays attribute requests between SPs and IdPs.
Our conceptual model for attribute aggregation assumes that users are the best, and probably only, persons to know the authoritative sources for their identity attributes-who issues their credit cards, passports, health cards, drivers' licenses, group memberships, and so on. The model also puts a premium on privacy protection in response to a requirements survey that we carried out prior to designing our system. 7 Toward that end, the linking service is designed to hold links between the user's various IdPs, as directed by the user, while preserving user privacy as far as is possible.
While each IdP knows one partial identity of the user, only linked IdPs may become aware of just one other IdP-the authenticating IdP-during service provision. The linking service knows that a user has several linked partial identities, but it doesn't know any of them or who the user is because it delegates user authentication to the linked IdPs. Consequently, the service only knows that some user is known to several IdPs, and it holds the links to these on behalf of the user without knowing who the user is.
When the user contacts an SP for service provisioning and is redirected to his chosen IdP for authentication, this IdP returns a pointer to the linking service in its response. This allows the SP to contact the service to achieve attribute aggregation. The linking service may either relay the SP's request to each linked IdP, and the encrypted responses back to the SP, or it may return the set of linked IdPs to the SP, allowing it to aggregate the attributes. The service is entirely under the control of the user, who creates and deletes the links, and indicates which linked IdPs can be released to which SPs through an IdP link release policy. register to use the University of Kent's computing services, she must first present her passport and existing qualifications to prove she is entitled to register as a student. We call this the registration LOA. Different systems will require different registration documents and have different registration procedures, and will therefore have different registration LOAs. After successful registration, the university allocates the student a login ID (her identifier) and associates various attributes with this in its database, for example, degree course, student's name, date of birth, e-mail address, department, tutor, and so on. The university may offer different authentication mechanisms for student login, such as un/pw with Kerberos, un/pw with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), one-time passwords via a mobile phone, and so on. The system assigns each of these mechanisms an authentication LOA with the proviso that no authentication LOA can be higher than the registration LOA that originally authenticated the user. When a user logs in for a session, the system assigns her a session LOA equivalent to the authentication LOA of the authentication mechanism she chose to use.
Returning to the linking service, we have made provisions to include the LOA in our protocol messages. When the service redirects the user to an IdP during the link registration phase, she authenticates to the IdP with her preferred authentication mechanism, and this has an associated authentication LOA. The IdP may return this as the current session LOA to the linking service along with the PID. The service stores this session LOA as the user's registration LOA for this PID/IdP tuple, as shown in Table 1 . Figure 2 illustrates the service provision phase. When Julie wishes to use a Web service, she first contacts the website. The SP doesn't know who she is and so redirects her to her IdP for authentication. In the Shibboleth model, the SP does this either directly in a small federation or indirectly via a "where are you from?" service. In CardSpace, the SP returns Julie to her Identity Selector, whereupon she picks a card that represents her chosen IdP. Julie then presents her authentication credentials to the IdP, either directly in Shibboleth, or indirectly in CardSpace.
service provisioning
Support for attribute aggregation, which can simply be a tick box alongside the username/password screen, enhances the authentication dialogue. With direct IdP authentication, the IdP can show this enhanced screen because it knows if it has already generated one or more PIDs for Julie with one or more linking services. With CardSpace, the application can show this enhanced screen if the SP says that it supports attribute aggregation. Table 1 .
Because each PID is a secret between the linking service and the issuing IdP, it must be encrypted with the recipient's public key when being transferred between the two. A variant of this model could have personal linking services running on each user's PC.
Level of assurance
Different IdPs will authenticate users in different ways and to different strengths. For example, usernames and passwords are weaker than public-key certificates and private keys. A relying party's level of assurance (LOA) that the user is really who it thinks she is depends not only on the electronic authentication method used but also on the initial registration process. For example, registering electronically over the Web is much weaker than turning up in person with a passport.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends four LOA levels, with level 4 the strongest and level 1 the weakest. 8 Some SPs may wish to grant a user different access permissions based on the LOA during the current session. For example, if the user authenticates with an LOA of 1, she can read the resource, but with an LOA of 3 she can modify its contents. A limitation of the NIST recommendation is that the LOA is a compound metric dependent on the strength of both the registration process and the electronic authentication method. We believe it's more useful if they're separate metrics.
Prior to any computer-based authentication, a user must register with a service and provide various credentials to prove her identity. For example, before a new student can 
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a new card to the Identity Selector after it has established a PID for Julie with a linking service.) If Julie chooses to perform attribute aggregation, the IdP includes one or more referrals in its response to the SP. A referral in effect says, "you may find additional attributes for this user at this provider." A referral in this instance points to a linking service and includes Julie's PID encrypted on the service's public key. When the SP receives the authentication assertion containing her identity attributes, it will grant access if these are sufficient for the requested service. If they aren't and the SP supports attribute aggregation, it will forward each referral to their respective linking services along with the authentication assertion to prove that Julie has been authenticated. It sets a Boolean attribute in the request either asking the linking service to perform the aggregation or indicating it will perform the aggregation itself.
When the linking service receives the referral, it decrypts the PID and searches for this in its IdP linking table. Upon locating the appropriate table entry, the service retrieves the other table entries for Julie. Next, the linking service looks in its link release policy table to see which of the linked IdPs it can send to this SP. If the SP asked to perform the aggregation, the linking service returns referrals to the allowed IdPs, with the PIDs encrypted to their respective IdPs. The SP then follows these referrals in the same way that it did the original ones. If the SP asked the linking service to perform aggregation on its behalf, the linking service sends attribute query requests to the allowed IdPs, forwarding the SP's name and the authentication assertion so that the IdPs can encrypt their responses to the SP's public key and tie the attributes to the identifier found in the authentication assertion.
Finally, the IdPs digitally sign their responses. In this way, the SP ultimately receives an authentication assertion and multiple encrypted attribute assertions, all digitally signed by their authoritative sources and containing the same random user identifier as in the authentication assertion. The SP trusts all these sources and thus can be assured that Julie possesses all of the encapsulated identity attributes. The SP can make its access control decision based on her attributes and not on the random identifier.
LOas in service provisioning
The linking service may have stored registration LOAs in its IdP linking table during the user's link registration phase. Though not essential, they serve to improve the performance of all subsequent user-service sessions. During a user's service session, the linking service only utilizes linked IdPs whose registration LOAs exceed or equal the current session LOA provided by the IdP that authenticated the session. This prevents a user from creating links with low LOAs and subsequently using them at higher session LOAs, thereby pretending that the attributes have a high LOA. Conversely, a user can create links at high registration LOAs and then use them on lower session LOAs since the SP will know that the attributes can only be trusted up to the level of the current session LOA.
If the linking service has stored the user's registration LOA for a linked IdP and a different IdP subsequently authenticates a user-service session at a lower session LOA, the service can create a referral to the linked IdP. The linked IdP may then return user attributes at this low-session LOA. However, if the IdP authenticates the session at a higher session LOA than the registration LOA, the linking service won't create a referral to the linked IdP since the linked IdP always refuses to return any attributes for the user in this high-session LOA. This is because its attributes haven't been assured to such a high level and it violates the proviso that no authentication LOA can exceed the original registration LOA.
If the linking service hasn't stored the user's registration LOA for a linked IdP, then the service must create a referral to this IdP for all subsequent user-service sessions, providing the link release policy allows it. The IdP follows the same rules as above when deciding if the session LOA is low enough to return the user's attributes.
Link release policy
The user can create an IdP link release policy that tells the linking service which linked IdPs to release to which SPs. In the simplest case, which is normally the <NameIdPolicy> element is set to "urn:oasis:names: tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent," and the allowCreate attribute of the <NameIdPolicy> element is set to true, which allows the IdP to create a PID the first time around.
service provision protocols
We have devised two possible protocol mappings for attribute aggregation using Liberty Alliance protocols, and one using CardSpace protocols. All three mappings encode referrals as Liberty Alliance ID-WSF endpoint references (EPRs). 10 Each EPR points to a linking service or IdP where the SP can find additional attributes for the user, and each EPR's <sec:Token> contains the encrypted PID of the user at the IdP. The Liberty Alliance mapping we have implemented uses the Liberty ID-WSF discovery service.
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Liberty alliance protocols. After the user contacts the SP, it issues a SAML authentication request message that the user's browser passes to the IdP. This message asks the IdP to generate a random identifier for the user in the authentication response (by setting the format attribute to "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient") and to return both attributes and referrals (EPRs) in the response. The SAML response consists of a single signon (SSO) assertion containing three statements: an SSO authentication statement, an attribute statement containing the user's attributes, and an attribute statement containing each linking service's EPR. The authentication statement contains the session LOA.
Once the SP has received the SAML response, it may attempt to access each referral EPR using an ID-WSF discovery service. The DiscoveryQuery operation, which consists of Query and QueryResponse, enables a discovery service to be queried for relevant EPRs to other Web-based services. We define two types of DiscoveryQuery service: the first, sent from an SP to a linking service, asks for the linked IdPs' discovery services; the second, sent from a linking service or SP to an IdP's discovery service, asks for the EPR of its SAML v2.0 attribute authority so that the letter can subsequently be queried for the user's attributes.
To increase flexibility and let implementers replace IdPs with linking services recursively, we have designed the protocol so that a single DiscoveryQuery message contains a request for both types of service and is sent to both types of recipient. The recipient knows what type of service it can provide and so knows both how to respond to the query and which ServiceType elements inside the Query message to ignore. Consequently, only one service is returned in the response to each request. The SP need not know whether it's talking to a linking service or an IdP and can create its DiscoveryQuery messages to both in exactly the same way. the default policy, the user indicates (by an * in each column of the link release policy table) that the service can release all linked IdPs to all SPs. In the most complex case, the user requires a different set of linked IdPs for each SP. 
IMPLeMentatIOn
We have mapped our conceptual model to the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0 protocol 9 during the link registration phase, and to both Liberty Alliance and CardSpace protocols during the service provision phase. Our attribute aggregation model provides for passing LOAs between various components, but this currently isn't part of the SAML v2.0 specification. We have therefore used a draft SAML profile of the NIST LOA recommendation being developed by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS; www.oasis-open.org).
Link registration protocol
The link registration protocol uses standard SAML v2.0 authentication request/response messages 9 to request user authentication by a selected IdP and return a PID to the linking service. Upon receipt of the PID in the SAML response, the linking service either finds an existing entry in the IdP linking table for this PID/IdP tuple or creates a new entry in the table. Either way, the user can then link additional IdP accounts to this one.
To ensure that the IdP always returns a PID to the linking service, the SAML authentication request is constrained in the following ways: The format attribute of The DiscoveryQuery message contains the <sec:Token> copied from the referral EPR and the initial authentication assertion in the message's SOAP header. This is the only nonstandard part of the protocol; in the original SOAP binding, only the <sec:Token> would be present. The linking service decrypts the PID, retrieves the linked IdPs, and extracts the session LOA from the authentication assertion.
If the SP is performing aggregation, the linking service returns a QueryResponse containing referral EPRs to the discovery services of the user's linked IdPs that have registration LOAs greater or equal to the session LOA. The SP then sends a DiscoveryQuery message to each IdP's discovery service, requesting the EPR of the user's attribute authority.
Alternatively, if the linking service is performing the aggregation, it sends the same message to each IdP. The IdP's discovery service locates the user's account by decrypting the PID and, if the user's registration LOA is greater than or equal to the presented session LOA, it maps the random identifier from the authentication assertion into the user's account. The IdP returns a QueryResponse containing either the EPR of the attribute authority where the random identifier is now valid, or null if the query was invalid, for example, the session LOA was too high. The SP or linking service sends a standard <samlp:AttributeQuery> to the attribute authority, using the random identifier, whereupon the attribute authority returns a standard <samlp:Response>, encrypted so that only the SP can retrieve the attributes.
cardspace protocols. We have devised a protocol mapping for performing attribute aggregation within the CardSpace infrastructure that requires only minor changes to the CardSpace Identity Selector client and to the WS-Trust protocol.
After the user contacts the SP and is referred back to his CardSpace Identity Selector, the latter obtains the SP's security policy using the WS MetadataExchange protocol. The user picks a card and enters his login details at the prompt. If the SP has indicated in its service metadata that it accepts referral attributes, a check box labeled "Do you want to use your linked cards in this transaction?" appears below the authentication dialog. If the user checks the box, CardSpace attempts to get his claims using a modified WS-Trust message that contains a new Boolean attribute, aggregateIdentities, which states that referrals should be returned along with the user's attributes.
Assuming the user's authentication credentials are correct, the IdP returns a CardSpace "request security token response" message that contains a single SAML SSO assertion containing an authentication statement, a SAML attribute statement containing the user's attributes, and, if the user has linked this IdP to one or more linking services, an additional SAML attribute statement containing referrals to the linking services. CardSpace relays this as-IEEE Software seeks practical, readable articles that will appeal to experts and nonexperts alike. 
